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I. Introduction * 
Various analysts have commented on developing countries trade and 
exchange policies which permit importation of capital equipment at favor­
able exchange rates, e.g. Little, Scitovsky, and Scott [6]. It is argued 
that such policies artifically reduce the ratio of capital to labor costs 
and induce the adoption of capital intensive imported technology and/or the 
undertaking of capital intensive projects which appear profitable only be­
cause of the prevailing distortions in factor pricing. Thus, the under­
pricing of imported equipment would influence the type and sector-alloca­
tion of foreign technology, and tend to reduce the employment opportun­
ities in the modernized industrial sector of developing countries and 
the rate of absorption of labor released from traditional sectors. In 
addition, there is the view that such a policy will be detrimental to 
employment to the extent that it inhibits either the growth or establish­
ment of cbmestic equipment industries. Pack and Todaro [8] argue that 
these industries produce machinery which is more labor intensive and thus 
better adapted to the relative factor endowments of labor surplus econ­
omies. They also cite evidence which suggest that the domestic resource 
requirements of the equipment industries are not such as to coun~eract 
these benefits. This evidence supports the hypothesis that (a) the mach­
inery industries themselves are not highly capital intensive and (b) the 
real resource cost of a dollar reduction in machinery imports is low 
relative to the cost of import substitution in other manufactured com-
rnodities. 
The purpose of this paper is to develop a theoretical framework for 
* We are grateful to Richard Brecher for helpful discussion. Errors, 
of course, are our own. 
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analyzing the employment effects of changes in the mix of imported and 
domestically-produced equipment when the two. types of equipment may be 
1viewed as different factors of production. We confine ourselves to 
considering only the case where the changes in equipment composition are 
induced by policies affecting both the general and the equipment tariff 
rates. 
In section II, the structure of a general equi~ibrium trade model 
involving labor and the two forms of equipment is analyzed. Open un­
employment of labor arises in this system as a consequence of two factor 
prices, the real wage and the user cost of imported equipm8nt, being 
exogenously specified. Section III consists of a detailed analysis of 
equipment and general tariff rate changes on the aggregate employment 
rate. In section IV, the effect on social welfare of a change in the 
equipment tariff rate is investigated along with the possibility of con­
flict between welfare improvement and increases in the employment rate. 
In section V, we empirically test some of the assumptions unique to our 
model: in particular, that industries which are heavy users of imported 
equipment are more capital intensive~ i.e., employ more total capital per 
unit of output and labor, than industries with a low component of import~d 
equipment. Turkey's 1964 Census of Manufacturing and Business Establish­
·ments (covering business activities in 1963) is one of the few industrial 
1such an assumption is legitimate where the comparative cost of LDC's 
producing the simple machinery associated with labor intensive techniques 
is a great deal lower than that of more complex, heavier machinery. Also, 
because of established lending and trade arrangements, certain types of 
equipment suitable to the domestic factor endowment J11ay not be imported 
even though they are produced abroad. See Ranis [9, P• 5]. 
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cen3~ses which presents a breakdown of equipment investment into domes­
tically-produced and imported categories. We fit our hypothesized rela­
tionships between sectoral wage and equipment shares to data drawn from 
this census. The final section involves a summary of the empirical and 
theoretical findings and their policy implications. 
I. THE MODEL 
A. Production. Let us consider an economy composed of two sectors, with 
production functions of the form 
(1.1) x. = A. (k . )
l. l. mi 
,., 
where i = 1,2,x. is the ratio of value added (at base-year world prices)
l. 
to employment in the ith sector, 
k . is the ratio of imported equipment (valued at world prices)
mi 
to employment in the ith sector 
and kdi is the ratio of domestically produced equipment (valued 
1 
at world prices) to employment in the ith sector. 
The sector one connnodity is assumed to be the import competing good, and 
the sector two commodity, the exportable. We assume that domestically­
produced equipment is assembled in the import-competing sector, but is 
not traded to a significant degree (even though it is possible to use or 
1we confine ourselves to the Cobb-Douglas formulation, because it is 
highly amenable to empirical testing. 
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produce the same type of equipment abroad). We have chosen the physical 
units of total service time in which the two forms of capital are measured so 
as to make both their world and internal prices equal. This formulation in 
the case where the tariff rate on competitive is higher than that on noncompetitive 
machinery imports (an assumption tested later) implies that domestically-
produced equipment will not be traded. Plant investment is assumed to de-
dend on the total level and not the composition of equipment investment, and 
the sector producing structures is treated as exogenous to the system. Let us 
suppose that the coefficients of the production functions in the two sectors 
are restricted in the following way: 
(1.2) a + bl > a + b1 2 2 
(1.3) a /b > a /b
1 1 2 2 
The first assumption indicates that, in competitive equilibrium, the rela­
tive share of capital is higher in sector 1 than it is in sector 2. The 
second assumption implies that the ratio of imported to domestic equipment 
in sector l will exceed that in sector. 2. 
Two of the factor prices are exogenously fixed. The real wage rate 
(expressed in terms of commodity 2) is equal to an institutionally­
determined minimum (~ ). The second exogenously-specified factor price
2 
is the user cost of imported capital, which is assumed to be a policy 
instrument. Assume that home country can influence the world price of 
its exports but not that of equipment imports or imports in general. 
Denote the fixed world price of imported equipment by q, the effective 
equipment tariff by t, and the interest rate on imported equipment by r 
Ill• 
Then, neglecting corporate income taxes, the user cost of imported 
equipment is defined by the relationship 
u r (1 + t)q 
m Ill 
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Assuming r , as well as q, is exogenously determined, the user cost for m 
imported equipment would then depend on the tariff policy of the develop-
ing country. 
Given the restrictions on the production function parameters, the 
total capital-employment ratio (k . + kd.) will be higher in sector l than 
mi l. 
it is in sector 2, provided the user cost of imported (u) is not greater than 
ill 
that of domestically produced equipment, ~ud), i.e., um~ ud. For proof 
of this proposition (designated as Lemmal), see Appendix A. 
With factor prices determined as noted above, the production side of 
the system is summarized by the equilibrium conditions: 
(1.4) 
a -1 
uml = alAl (kml) l 
where w denotes the institutionally determined wage rate expressed in 
2 
terms of commodity 2 and~ml 
, the user cost of imported capital expressed 
in terms of commodity l. In competitive equil:::..brium, relative factor 
prices will be equal in the two sectors. 
1 From this relationship it is 
clear that kmZ and kd 2
are functions of kml and kdl respectively. By 
subs ti tuting these relationships into (l. 4) and (1. 5) we obtain: 
(1.6) 
a - 1 
(1.7) uml = alAl (kml) l 




a2 (1 - a - b). . 1 1 =µl (1 - a - b2) al2 
and, 
b2 (1 - al - b1) =µ2 (1 - a - b2) bl2 
Once kml and kdl have been determined by means of these expressions, the 
equilibrium conditions (relating factor proportions to relative factor prices) 
may be used again to determine the two wage rental ratios and the two capital­
employment ratios in sector 2. Thus with two factor prices specified, factor 
proportions are determined in each sector. 
The transformation surface corresponding to given values of w and
2 
u can be derived in the following manner: the aggregate ratio of importedm1 
to domestically-producP~ equipment can range between O and 1. Since the in­
dividual equipment components are subject only to non-negativity constraints, 
the limit on factor use in each sector is the condition: 
(1. 8) 
0 < >.. < l 
where e is the aggregate employment rate, k is the specified total capital-
labor ratio, and>.. is the proportion of the total employed labor force in 
sector 1. Then the production functions in the two sectors may be re-
written as follows: 
a bl 
(1. 9) X = e i.. (k ) 1 (kdl)1 ml 
a,. 1-. 
L. LJ2(1. 10) x = e 11. (km2)2 (kd2) 
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'\ 
where x. is the ratio of value added in sector i to total labor force 
l. 
(including both the employed and unemployed). 
Given a value for x
1 
, the valued added- total labor ratio for sec-
tor 1, e and >. may be determined by solving (1.8) and (1.9) simultaneously; the 
specified factor prices determine the capital-employment ratios in each sec­
tor. From (1.10), in turn the ratio of value added in sector 2 to the tot-
al labor force is obtained. The relationship between x and x , de!"ived from
2 1 
(1.8), (1.9), and (1.10), may be written simply as: 
(l.ll) 




capital-output ratio in sector 2 (k
'\, 
).2 
In Figure 1, T T is the transformation surface in the region of1 2 
incomplete specialization. Since TI is constant, the surface is linear. 
It is clear that a movement along this surface from T to T
2 
, implying1 
greater production of commodity 2, is associated with an increase in the 
employment rate. In order to keep the aggregate capital-labor ratio 
constant, the employment rate must increase since a larger proportion of 
total capital would have to be allocated to the sector with the relatively 
low capital-employment rate. 
The commodity price 1:;ne in Figure 1, is represented by p'p'. If 
we denote the ratio of the internal price of commodity 2 to the internal 
price of commodity 1 by P then the slope of this is equal to -1/p. To 







increases as the output share of commodity 2 rises, it is necessary to 
show that the absolute value of the slope of T T , TI, is steeper than 2 1 
that of the commodity price line, p'p'. 
In Appendix A we prove the propostion (Lemma 2) that TI >1/p only 
if the total capital-output ratio is higher in sector 1 than it is in 
sector 2, i.e. n is greater than unity. 
B. Demand 
The demand side of the system is based on standard trade theory. 
From the equilibrium condition 
which j_mplies that 
where w is real wage expressed in terms of commodity 1, it is clear that 1 
the commodity price ratio, p, is uniquely determined by the specified 
set of factor prices (~ and ~ml) in the region of incomplete special­2 
ization. The wage rate expressed in terms of commodity 1, w1
, depends 
only on the two capital-employment ratios in sector 1, given by (1. 6) and 
(1.7). Define total capital income per laborer (total payments to capital 
divided by the labor force) by the identity 
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where kd is the aggregate ratio of domestically produced equipment to 
labor. Total wage income per laborer, w (expressed in terms of good 
1) is defined by the identity 
(1.14) w = 
Demand in the two sectors may be broken down into two components: investment 
and consumer-good demand. Suppose that the rate of depreciation on the 
two kinds of equipment is equal to the same magnitude and the system is 
. d 'l'b . lin stea y state equ1 1 r1um. Then total gross investment per laborer 
expressed in terms of good 1 (i) is given by the expression 
(1.15) i = (n + o) k 
We assume that consumer demand for commodity i is determined by the 





(w - 0i, y - (1 - 0)i, P) 
Where 0 is the proportion of gross investment financed by wage income. 
1Governrnent savings and taxes are adjusted to offset changes in 
private savings associated with changes in the level and functional dis­
tribution of income. 
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By substituting (1.13), (1.14), and (1.15) into the consumer demand function, 
we obtain 
(1.17) c. = c' (w , p, e, -k, kd) 
l. i 2 
In Appendix Bis shown that kd is determined by a function of the form 
where 'i' > 0 
e 
Therefore substituting (1.:8) into (1.17) yields 
Finaldemand for sector 1 commodity per laborer (d1
) and final demand for 
the sector 2 good per laborer (d ) are given by the relations2 
111 k) + (n + o)(1.20) d = C (;;2, . p, e, k 
1 
112 
d2 = C (;;2, p, e, k) 
Recall (a) that each combination of x1 
and x
2 
represents a unique 
value of e and (b) that pis given by the specified factor prices 
(w and um ). Then by starting at T and moving up the transformation 
2 1 1 
surface in Figure 2, we may determine the final demands for each commodity 
from (1.20). If the user cost of domestically-produced equipment (ud) 
is great than that of imported capital (an assumption we shall make through­
out this paper), then, from (1.13) and (1.18), an increase in the output 
- l.L. -
. '..JI::1'"!(>·].1 t )~ ~,.... \.X) 
( ~.1._.c,, : fl tei:s i ve) 
T T'
1 1 
Co::-i::1od5. ty One 
(Capit<ll !ntcnsive) 
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share of commodity 2, and thus e, will increase both wage and capital income. 
Under these conditions the curve RR, giving the final demand combinations
l 2 · 
corresponding to each point on the transformation surface, will be positively 
sloped assuming that neither commodity is inferior (i.e., the partial 
derivatives of the consumer demand function with respect tow and y are 
both positive). 
We also assume imports per laborer of good 1, m
1 
, and exports per 







From the demand curve R R and the transformation surface T T2 we can then1 2 1 
derive the home country's offer curve from the two commodities. From the 
production-cum-demand combinations ass~ciated with given points on T1T2 
(e.g., g -cum-g ) in Figure 2, offer triangles may be formed. In the
1 2 
case of the triangle g Mg , Mg represents the exports which are offered
1 2 2 
for an equal value of imports. The autarchy point is determined by the 
intersection of the demand curve with the transformation surface. 
Placing all such triangles into Figure 3 produces the offer curve 
· D D • This offer curve is of the straight line Ricardi an variety in the
2 1 
region of incomplete specialization. By contrast, the foreign offer OSF 
curve has the conventional shape associated with an import price elasticity 
C:Jr:,~,1c:..!: tv ·..'nc 
(ll0ne exports 
and Fo1~e i.gn 
imports) 
Con:-iocitv Two 




ri 1ure 3 
J J' 
Corn10,!: ty -:-\:o 




( ! i0!:1C i LpC·r-t ::~ 
and rare 3., 'L 
expor-:~,) 
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less than infinite. In Figure 3, the offer triangle corresponding to the 
This hasintersection of the home and foreign offer curves OSJ is shown. 
the same dimensions as the offer t · 1 M h e equilibrium productionr1ang e g1 g2 at t 
point. 
II. Employment Effects of Equipment and Overall Tariff Changes 
A. Changes in the User Ccst of Imported Equipment 
The model presented in the first section enables us to analyze the 
effects of a change in the relative cost of imported equipment on employ­
ment. To do so, let us assume first an increase in the user cost of 
imported equipment through, for example, an equipment tariff increase, with 
the overall tariff rate remaining constant. Such a policy change will have 
two broad effects on employment: first there is the direct.substitution of 
labor for capital arising from the factor price change; second indirect 
substitution would occur as a result of a change in the commodity price 
ratio and the bill of goods demanded, with an associated change in the out­
put share of the labor-intensive good. 
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To determine the effect of an increase in the user cost of imported 
equipment (expressed in terms of good 1), ~ml on the capital labor ratios 
in the two sectors, let us differentiate (1.6) and (1.7) totally to obtain 
the effect of ~ml on kdl and kml with w held constant. Denote the2 
Jacobian matrix for equations (1.6) and (1.7) by J and the value of its 
determinant by IJI. Then the expressions for the total changes in dkdl 
and dkml' with w
2 
constant may be written as: 
where 
(1 - b )- a2 2 
=Hl µ2 ud2 
13 1 




The s_ign conditions 
dkm 
(2.3) 1 -H < 0
d~l = 1 
dkd 
(2.4) 1 H > 0dum 21 
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are unambiguous, since the determinant of the Jacobian, /J/, can be 
shown to be always positive. The equi~ibrium conditions equating 
relative factor prices in ~he two sectors imply that kmZ must move in 
the same direction as kml and kdZ must move in the same direction as kd •1 
What, then, is the impact of an increase in Uilll on the total capital 
employment ratio (k . + kd.) in each sector? To show that the total 
mi l. 
capital-employment ratio in sector 2 declines, we must show that the 
absolute value of the decline in kmZ exceeds the increase in kd • By2 
differentiating condition (1.4) totally it can show that 
urn< u
d 
A similar condition :-,::~~-- be derived for. sector 1, from (2.1) and (2. 2). 
The conclusion from this analysis is that the effect of a change in 
tariff on import equipment on the total captial employment rate in each 
sector is ambiguous. Provided,however, that the user cost of domestic 
exceeds that on imported equipment, an increase in tariff, in fact, 
l 
decrease total capital employment ratios in both sectors. 
1
This rather tedious and roundabout analysis is necessary becuase 
our assumptions about factor intensity in each sector pertains to factor 
shares rather than the capital/labor ratio. In turn these assumptions 
have been chosen hecuase they are easier to test empirically in the context 
of developing countries. 
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In the same connection,it is important to stress that in both sectors 
a decline of the total captial/employment ratio is associated with a de­
cline of the capital output ratio. In the case of sector 2 this is ob­
vious if the total capital/employment ratio falls, the capital output ratio 
must decline, since the employment/output ratio determined by w remains 
2 
constant. 
Differentiating the expression for the capital output in sector 1 
totally yields 
dk dl+ c· (1 - b - b
1 1 
1IB ( ) -al (kdl-Bl'where G = l1 km1 
Therefore, since 
it follows that the capital-output ratio will decline in sector 1 if 
(2. 7) (1 - B - B1 1 
In competitive equilibrium this sufficient condition reduces to 
(2.8) ud > um 
Thus if the rental rate on domestically-produced exceeds that on 
along wici1 the total capital employment, 
imported equipment the capital-output,ratios/will decline in both 
sectors. The implication of this decline is that an increase in u 
m 
results in an outward movement in transformation surface which is illus-
tratcd by the shift from T? to T1T2in Figure 2.2 
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It is clear from (1.12) that the commodity price ratio pis an 
increasing function of the real wage (expressed in terms of good 1). Thus, 
in competitive equilibri~m, we have 
bal 
(2.9) (1 - a - b) Al (km ) (kdl) 1 _ w1 = 1 1 1 p = 
w2w2 
By differentiating this relationship totally and using (2.1) and (2.2) 
to substitute ford km1 
and d kd
1
, we obtain the condition 
(2.10) dp > 
< 
Thus, given the restriction (1.3) on the production function parameters, the 
ratio of the price of commodity 2 to the price of commodity 1 must decline 
if um increases due to an increase in the equipment tariff rate. 1 
The nature of the demand change brought on by an increase in um1 
now can be analyzed geometrically. The fall in the ratio of the price of 
commodity 2 to price of commodity 1, together with the outward movement of 
the transformation surface, is associated with a shift in the home offer 
Icurve, from DlD2 to D 
1 D (in Figure 2) • The changes in the factor prices1 2 
-u and u will change the functional distribution of income associated 
ml dl 
with a given x and x combination. If the relative commodity price
1 2 
effects dominate the factor share effects of a change in uml the demand 
curve will shift to the left from R R to R 'R ' (see Figure 4). Suppose1 2 1 2 
that production is now at point g 'on the transformation surface R 'R2 '.2 1 
The segment g 'm' of the offer triangle g 'm'g2
' represents the amount ex-
1 1 
ported when production is at this point. Expor.ts at the new point of 
production are the same as in the original position. However, the associated 










are held constant at their initial level, there will be an excess demand 
for the home country's exportable in world markets. To eliminate this 
excess demand, exports must increase to point S. This implies a shift 
in production of the exportable commodity from g ' to g " in Figure 4. 
2 2 
Since this point is associated with greater specialization in commodity 2 
than point g ', it represents a higher level of employment and output
2 
measured at constant domestic prices. However, the relationship of the 
output share at point g 11 to that at initial point g remains uncertain. 2 2 
Since the position of the production point g2 
11 relative to the constant 
1 
output share line ON is ambiguous, the output share of the labor-intensive 
commodity may increase or decrease depending on such factors as the shift 
and curvature of the demand curve and the shift in the transformation 
surface. For example, if the demand curve is concave to the origin,and 
there are large outward movements in the transformation surface at the 
same time as the price elasticity of demand is low, the output share of the 
capital intensive sector may well increase. For this reason, the effect 
on employment of an increase in ~l cannot be established without further 
assumptions about the nature of demand shifts. 
ls it likely that the output share of the labor-intensive sector 
would decline sufficiently to counteract the decline in sectoral capital intensit: 
if cor.11Uodity 2 is not inferior? By examining the magnitudes of the home and 
foreign import price elasticities, we may be able to determine the condi­
tions for a total increase in the employment rate, and their likelihood to 
prevail. 
1 








• . 2 
.dP 
where z1 is the net imports of the f
irst commodity by the home country and 
z*2 is the net imports of good 2 by the rest of the world, T
he elasticity 
n1 must be interpreted a
s a partial elasticity since it represents response 
to price with the employment rate and w2 
held constant; the total import 
The elasticity nt, is the conventionalelasticity in this case is infinite. 2 
It is shown in Appendix Btotal price elasticity for the rest of the world. 
that, given non-inferiority and ud greater than um,the employme
nt rate will 
increase if the familiar Marshall-Lerner condition 
(2.13) 
is met. 
The restriction tha!: u d exceed urn is a sufficient but no.t a nec
essary 
condition for an increase in aggregate employment rate when the 
Marshall­
Lerner condition is met. If the total capital employment ratio
 is higher in 
sector 1 than it is in sector 2, then the aggregate employment 
rate will 
increase even though the total capital employment ratios in the 
two sectors 
may rise. In this instance, the indirect substitution resulting
 from in­
crease in the output share of the labor intensive sector outweig
hs the de­
pressing effect of the direct substiLition of capital for labor 
on employ­
ment in both sectors. 
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B. Changes in ov•~rall tariffs 
Aggregate income and employment may be increased by an overall re­
duction in trade barriers, e.g. through lowering of overall tariff rates 
or the provision of export subsidies, but keeping the tariffs on equip­
ment constant. Such policies may be designed to increase the output 
share of the labor intensive sector. In the context of our model, this 
would be accomplished by changing the slope of the linear segment of the 
home offer curve without affecting either the demand curve or the trans­
formation surface. Since relative factor prices would remain fixed, the 
increase in employment would result purely from indirect substitution. 
The conditions under which a given policy will have the desired effect 
are presented in the standard trade literature. The case being consider­
ed is the one in which the relatively labor intensive commodity is being 
exported. In this case, it is well known that, provided the Metzler 
paradox does not hold, an export subsidy or tariff decrease will cause 
the real wage to rise. In constrast to the standard trade model in our 
model, unemployment causes the real wage to remain at a specified minimum. 
However, with downward wage rigidity and unemployment, the standard 
imply anconditions ensuring an increase in the real wage in our system 
1
increase in emp laymen t. 
1In this case, our model is perfectly analogous to the two-factor 
model presented by Brecher. His results and accompanying proofs apply 
here. See [l, pp. 123-131] and [2]. 
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III. Welfare Implications 
We confine ourselves to the welfare effects of changes in the tariff on 
equipment,since the overall tariff results, in our model,are identical to 
Brecher's [l ]. Welfare analysis is considerably complicated by the re-
distribution of income among laborers and owners of imported and domestic­
ally-produced equipment due to a change in um1 
. For the sake of simplicity, 
let us assume that the utility functions of all individuals in the economy 
are the same (implying equal marginal propensities to consume out of wage 
and capital income). Let us further assume that lump-sum transfers are 
used to distribute the welfare effects of a particular policy measure 
equally among the different classes of income earners. Under these as­
sumptions, the welfare function takes the form 
where a is the constant labor-force participation rate, N is the specified 
population level, and 
'\,
w is aggregate welfare. 
Taking C.
l. 





) with respect to um1
, we obtain 
=(3.2) 




if P = u /u , i.e., the marginal condition for utility maximization is met.
2 1 
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With balanced trade, 
* is the world price ratio of good 2 to good 1. With all tariff 
(3. 3) 
where p 
rates zero initially, 
*(3. 4) p = p 
A5Sume that this condition is met and note that 
= 
Define GDP per laborer (expressed in terms of good 1), q1
, by the rela­
tionship 
(3. 5) = 







From (3.5), it can be shown that 
(3. 7) '¥e 
where '¥e is the partial derivative of (1.JB), the function determining ~d, 
with respect toe. Thus, if 
- 26 -
ud 1 > um1 
, 
(3. 8) > w > 0
1 
Moreover, from the condition equating the marginal product in both sec'.:ors 
to the real wage and the relationship 
we obtain 
ax2 
(3.10) P""ap" = vl + v2 
(l-a -b )
2 2
where v = 1 = 1.1 - (1-a -b )1 1 





The terms of this expression represent a de-composition of the effects 
of a change in um on welfare. First there is the effect of a change
1 
in um on the employment rate and the associated change in wage and 
1 
capital income with factor and connnodity pr~ces held fixed. Under the 
usual assumption that 
this component of the effect of a decrease in um on welfare will be1 
positive; since, from (3,8), aq /ae will be unequivocally positive.
l 
Then there is the :.;-,:pact of change in output per employed laborer in 
- 27 -
sector 1 brought on by a change in um and an associated change in the1 
commodity price ratio. This impact with output shares constant is 
reflected in v
1 , which is positive. The effect of varying the output 
share of sector 2 with labor productivity and the employment rate con­
stant is represented by v , which is negative when ud exceed um. All2 
these changes are evaluated at the initial connuodity price ratio. 
Finally, the term (x - c ) brings out the effect of a shift in the2 2 
terms of trade. If the home country exports commodity 2, there 
(x - c ) will be positive. It is impossible to determine, in general,2 2 
whether or not the absolute value of v
2 
exceeds that in v1 . Therefore, 
since~ is negative, the impact of a change in mn on welfare is1dmn1 
ambiguous. 
Nonetheless, if, as is often argued, the foreign import price elas­
ticity is close to infinite, the absolute value of the term 
de
'dq/ ae 
1We have proven earlier that when the employment rate is allowed 
to vary the decrease in p associated with an increase in will causeum1 
the transformation surface to shift completely out}"ard. However, when 
the employment rate is fixed, there is an inward shift everywhere except 
at the point of complete specialization in commodity 2. 
1 
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will be very large. See Appendix B. Consequently, in cases where the 
foreign offer curve is highly elastic it is quite clear that increases in 
um will lead to increase in both welfare and the employment rate. 
IV. Empirical Tests 
In part III, we derived conditions under which an increase in tariff 
rate on imported equipment and a reduction in the overall tariff rate will 
lead to a rise in the aggregate employment rate. The remainder of this 
paper is devoted to an analysis of whether or not these conditions pre­
vailed in one developing country examined, Turkey. This analysis was 
based first on the assumption implied by conditions (1. 2) and (1. 3) that 
the wage share is higher in the sector with the lower ratio of imported 
to domestically-produced equipment, i.e., when cross-sectional compar­a 
ison is made, the wage share is negatively associated ,:ith the ratio of 
. d 1 . · himporte to tota equipment in eac sector.. l Second, it was shown that, 
under reasonably realistic assumptions about demand elasticities in 
foreign trade, an increase in equipment tariffs would unambiguously 
increase both welfare employment if two additional conditions 
were met: 
(a) the user cost of domestic exceeded that 
of imported equipment; and 
(b) the sector with the higher total capital 
employment ratio required more capital per unit 
of output than the sector with the lower capital­
employment ratio. 
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We shall now test the validity of these assumptions in the case of one 
developing country, Turkey. 
A. Equipment composition and wage shares. 
The hypothesis involving factor shares may be tested in several ways. One 
approach is to use a linear approximation of the relationship between the wage 
share and the intensity of imported equipment. Let us substitute the 
ratio of imported to total gross equipment investment, Im/I, for the ratio 
of imported to total equipment stock (Km/K). Now suppose that we estimate 
the relationship 
(4.1) w/v - A + A (Im/I)+ e 
0 1 
where w/v is the wage share, A and A are coefficients, and e is an 
0 1 
error term. Our null hypothesis in this case is that 
Fitting the equation (4.1) to a cross section of sectors presents a num­
1 
ber of problems. First, Im/I may not be a good proxy for Km/k. Second, 
to the extent that the relationships is non-linear, A1 
will be an incon­
sistent estimate of the partial derivative of the dependent with respect 
to the independent variable evaluated at the mean value of Im/I. The 
,.. 
last and perhaps the most serious difficulty is that the error term e is 
not normally distributed since the dependent variable is constrained to 
lie between O and 1. 
are1For the implications,. of using flow rather than stock estimates 
explored in [ 7]. 
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To overcome the limited dependent variable problem, we assume that 
the relationship between w/v and Im/I takes the form of a logistics curve. 
1(3.2) w* = 
1 + eAl + Azk* + E 
where w* = w/v, k* = Km/K, and Eis a normally distributed error term with 
a mean of zero. Our null hypothesis is that A is positive, implying that1 
the wage share is a decreasing function of k*. By taking logs and re-
arranging terms, we obtain 
Note that the dependent variable in this equation has the limits 
lim log (1/w* - 1) = - ro 
w* + 1 
lim log (1/w* - 1) + oo 
w + 0 
which are consistent with the normally-distributed error term. 
We fitted (4.3), with Im/I substituted fork*, to data taken from the 
1963 Turkish manufacturing census [11]. The regression equation, estimated 
from a sample of 104 manufacturing sectors (at the three and four digit 
level) took the form: 
(4.4) log (1/w* - 1) = .451 + .007 Im/I 
(4. 7) (3.1) 
F = 9.31 
The coefficient for Im/I has the hypothesized positive sign and is significantly 
1 non-zero at the one percent level. The magnitude of the F statistic indicates 
that, although the value of the R2 coefficient is low, it is significantly 
greater than zero at the one percent level. 
11n each regression, the numbers in parentheses represent the ratio 
of the parameter estimate to its standard error. 
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It is possible that Im/I is positively correlated with the scale of 
production in each sector. Since relative capital intensity may be an 
increasing function of scale, the negative association between Im/I and the 
wage share implied by (4.4) may be the result of omitting a scale variable 
from the regression equation. Suppose that we represent the average scale 
of production by means of ·the ratio X/n where X is total 
value added and n is the number of firms in each sector. Including this 
variable in the regression equation yields: 
log (1/w* - 1) = .442 + .006 Im/1 + .00001 !n 
(4.6) (2. 7) (1.5) 
F = 5.91 
The Im/I ratio still has a positive sign and is significantly non-zero at 
the five percent level. \-,Thile the coefficient for X/n has the hypothesizes 
sign, it is not significantly greater than zero at the five percent level. 
Further, by means of an F ratio test it can be shown that the explanatory power 
of (4.5) is not significantly greater than that of (4.4) at the five 
percent level. These results indicate the robustness of the hypothesized 
relationship between w* and Im/I. 
B. Implications for the capital-output ratio. 
Note that, while there is a significant association between the wage 
share and I~/1, the simple correlation coefficient between the money wage 
rate and Im/I was not significantly different from zero at the 5 percent 
level. This is important, since if money wage/capital rental ratio is the 
same for industries having both high and low imported-equipment intensities 
and total output equals total factor payments, the capital/labor 
ratio will be inversely related to the wage share. This negative 
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relationship holds a fortiori when, as the assumption 
implies the average money rental rate on capital is a decreasing function 
of Im/I and thus an increasing function of the wage share. Further, it is 
clear that if under these circumstances the money wage rates are the same 
in all sectors, the capital-output ratio will be an increasing function of 
the wage share and Im/I. Given an inverse relationship between the total 
capital employment ratio and the wage share, this implies that there will 
be no conflict between increases in output measured at domestic prices 
and employment when the output and capital share of the labor intensive 
sector rises with factor prices constant. This empirical evidence indicating 
a positive association between capital output and capital-employment ratios is 
the basis of the assumption, made in section II, that the absolute slope of the 
cormnodity price line is less than that of the transfonnation surface. (See 
Appendix A, lemma 2). 
C. Relative user costs. 
There are considerable problems in testing empirically the conditions 
in our model pertaining to the relative user costs on the two types of 
equipment. 
In Turkey external credit is generally used to finance imported 
equipment while internal credit can be used to finance both kinds. Ex­
ternal credit is granted on more concenssionary tenns than domestic 
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credit. However, it would be inappropriate to conclude on this b
asis 
The relative terms alone are not themselves con­alone that rd> rm. 
clusive evidence about the equilibrium user cost of capital beca
use during 
the period examined, the borrowing rate deviated from the physic
al return 
Domestic credit was rationed and relative credit availabilityon capital. 
was more important than terms [7]. But domestic interest rate p
egging com­
bined with a lack of excess bank reserves and stringent credit c
ontrols in­
dicates that the official interest rate on domestic credit under
stated its 
. 1 1t rue scarcity va ue. 
Neglecting corporate taxes, the user cost of capital is the prod
uct 
of the internal price of the capital good and the relevant inter
est 
rate. Kruegar presents evidence that effective exchange rate on
 non­
competitive is substantially lower than that on competitive equi
pment 
imports in Turkey during the 1960's [5].If, as in our model, units
 are 
chosen so as to equate the w~rld prices of the two forms of equi
pment, 
this evidence supports the hypothesis that the internal price of
 imported 
equipment does not exceed that of domestically-produced equipmen
t. In 
the Turkish case, there is no indication that corporate taxes an
d de­
preciation allowances depend on the origin of the equipment bein
g utilized. 
Thus internal price differential supported by the effective exch
ange 
with the observed differences in interest rates,rate evidence, along 
·does provide a prima facie case for ud exceeding um. 
1
See [ 5) and [10). 
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D. Exchange Liberalization and the Composition of Equipment Investment 
While no reliable time series exists on aggregate e~ployment in 
Turkey, there is evidence that the composition of equipment investment 
responded to equivalent tariff rate changes in a way which is consistent 
with our results. It may be argued that the ratio of the black market to 
the official exchange rate is a proxy for the degree of exchange control. 
Since there is evidence that import quota system in Turkey discriminates 
in favor of equipment imports, the more stringent the degree of quantita­
tive control, the more we would expect the equivalent tariff on equipment 
to decline relative to that on other commodities [5]. Consequently, 
an increase in the degree of quantitative control would, according to the 
results of our model, decrease the employment rate in two ways: (a) by in­
creasing the overall equivalent tariff rate and (b) by decreasing the ren­
tal rate on imported equipment deflated by the general import price index 
(um ). For the most part we would expect such a change to decrease the1 
desired level of domestically produced equipment. It is interesting to note 
that, in line with this hypothesis, there is a significant negative associa­
tion (at five per level using a one-tailed test) between the ratio of the 
black market to official exchange rate and to the level of gross domestic-e~uip­
1ment investment during the 1950-65 period. The association of this variable 
1
The regression equation took the form 
Id= -.430 + .018 GNP -.022 (BM/D) 
(15.85) (-1.83) 
R2 = .96, D.W. = 1.72, F = 145.85, 
where Id is real gross investment in domestically produced equipment, 
GNP is real gross national product and BM/Dis the ratio of the black 
market to the offid.al exchange rate. The sources for the investment 
and GNP data is Korum [ 4] and for the exchange rate data Pick's currency 
yearbook and the IMF International Ffoancial Statistics [12]. 
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with gross investment in imported equipment when net foreign inflow was 
included in the same regression was negative and insignificant. The expe
cted 
positive impact of lower real rental rate on investment in imported equip
­
ment may well have been counteracted by reduced capacity utilization duri
ng 
periods of stringent quantitative restriction not allowed for in our mod
el. 
Also, this rental rate when expressed in terms of non-traded rather than 




In this paper, we have developed a two-commodity general equilibrium 
model involving three factors of production. Because two factor prices 
are exogenously fixed, this model has a solution which implies open un­
employment of labor. It is assumed that the home country exports the 
relatively labor-intensive commodity, that the relative share of labor is 
higher in the sector with the lower ratio of domestic to imported 
equipment,and that the subsidization of imported equipment is carried to 
the point where its user cost lies below that of domestically-produced 
equipment. (These conditions are not necessary for some of our results 
to hold.) Neither commodity is inferior and there is incomplete special­
In this model the aggregate ratio of imported to domestically­ization. 
produced equipment is allowed to vary while the ratio of total equipment 
to labor is held fixed. These assumptions are sufficient but not 
necessary for the total capital employment to be higher in the sector 
which is intense in the use of imported equipment. (Given the wage 
share condition, a positive association may exist between total capital 
intensity and the share of equipment imported when the money rental on 
imported exceeds that on domestically-produced eq1..tipmcnt.) Finally, the 
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sector with the higher capital employment ratio is also assumed to be 
the sector with the higher capital-output ratio. 
This assumption, and the assumption about the relationship between 
equipment and wage shares are supported by data drawn from the Turkish 
manufacturing census. Similarly there is good reason to believe that 
imported equipment was subsidized heavily in Turkey during the 1960's. 
Investment in domestically produced equipment seemed to respond to changes 
in the degree of quantitative restriction in the direction implied by our model. 
In this context, we have analyzed the impact of equipment and overall 
tariff rate changes on aggregate employment and welfare. The policy im­
plications of our investigation may be summarized as follows: 
1. Given the assumption of the model, an increase (decrease) in the 
tariff rate on imported equipment (with the overall tariff rate constant) 
will increase (decrease) the aggregate employment rate if only the 
Marshall-Lerner condition is met. 
2. This result still holds even if the user cost on imported is 
greater than that on domestically-produced equipment as long as the total 
capital-employment ratio is higher in the sector which is relatively in­
tense in imported equipment. 
3. An increase (decrease) in the equipment tariff rate will cause 
the total capital-employment ratios ,in each sector to fall (rise) only if 
the user cost on imported is less than that on domestically-produced 
equipment. 
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4. If the home country exports the capital-intensive rather than 
the labor-intensive commodity, an equipment tariff increase will still 
cause the employment rate to increase provided the Marshall-Lerner condi­
tion is met. (See Appendix B.) The employment impact of an overall tariff 
change under these conditions is reversed. 
5. If the Metzler paradox conditions do not hold, an overall tariff 
reduction (increase) will cause both the employment rate and the aggregate 
ratio of domestically-produced to imported equipment to increase (decrease). 
6. Generally speaking, the impact of an equipment tariff increase 
and an overall tariff reduction on social welfare is ~mbiguous. (The latter 
is a function commodity consumption levels.) But if, as is frequently 
the case, world demand for the export commodity is highly elastic, the 
two variables will change in the same direction. 
7. Devaluation cum liberalization measures which (a) reduce the 
overall rate of effective protection and/or (b) increase the rate of 
protection on captial goods relative to other goods are likely to be 
beneficial to employment as a result of changes in output composition 
and factor policies, apart from effects on overall business activity. 
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Appendix A 
L2.mma _!:The total capital employment ratio is higher in sector 1 than it 
is in sector 2 if the user cost imported equipment (u) is lowerm 
than that for domestically-produced equipment (ud). 
Proof: In competitive equilibrium, we have 
al w a2 w 




(1 - a2 - b2) 
u
m1 1 ·m 
(A. l) bl w b2 w
= kd2 =kd1 (1 - a. - b1 ) ud 
(1 - a2 - b 2
) ud
1 
is the money wage rate, um 
is the money rental rate on importedwhere w 
equipment, and ud is the money rental rate on domestically-produced equip-
ment. The restrictions
1 on the production function parameters, (1.2) and 
(1.3), imply that 
(A.2) 
It follows from this result and conditions (1.4) that 
{A.3) 
As long as kd 2 does not 
exceed kd1 
by an amount which is greater than the 
difference between km1 
and km
2 
, the total capital employment ratio will be 
higher in sector 1 than it is in sector 2. This will be true as long as 
.1
From (1.3), we obtain a 1 
> a 2 (b/
b2)
. Thus the inequality a 1 
> a 
2 




.::_ 1 and al< a2, then 
bl+ al < b2 + a2 which contradicts con
dition (1.2). 
- 39 -
(A.4) Aw/~> B w/ud 
where 
al a2 
A= (1 - al - b1)
 (1 - a2 - b2) 
and 
b2 b2
B = (1 - a2 - b2) (1 - al - b1 ) 
Define 
(A.5) 
Then the total capital employment ratio i
n sector 1 will be greater than 
that in sector 2 if and only if 
(A. 6) A> -yB 
Since condition (1.2) implies that A exce
eds B, a sufficient condition for 
this inequality to hold is that 
(A. 7) -y < 1 
The absolute value of the slope of the tr
ansformation surface is
Lemma 2: 
greater than that of the commodity price 
line if and only if the 
total capital output ratio is higher in s
ector 1 than it is in 
sector 2. 




is given by the 
expression 
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tml + kdl)(A.8) 7T = 
(km2 + kd2) 
Making use of the equilibrium condition 
(.-',.. 9) 
to substitute for x and x and yields2 1 
(1 - a - b )1 1(A.10) 
p (1 - a - b )
2 2 
Substituting the conditions given in (A.l) into this expression yields: 
The bracketted expression represents the ratio of the total capital out-
put ratio in sector 1 to the total capital output ratio in sector 2. 
The inequality 
(A.12) 1r >1/p 
insures that a movement from T to T in Figure 1 will be accompanied by an1 2 
increase in GDP per labor (measured at constant domestic prices). It is 
clear that a necessary and sufficient condition for the ineguality 
1T >l/p 
is that the bracketted term in (A.11) exceed unity. 
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Appendix B 
An Algebraic Analysis of Employment Change 
Recall that commodity 1 is assumed to be the import-competing good
. 
The o~tput of this commodity per laborer, x1 , 
depends on the aggregate 
capital-labor ratio, the employment rate, the commodity price rati
o, and 
the real wage (expressed in terms of commodity 2). Net imports of 
connnodity 1 per laborer, z1
, are given by the equation 
where 
and 
When factor proportions are held fixed, kd is uniquely determined
 bye. 
From ( 1.8) and the identity 
(where. ;>,. is the proportion of employed labor allocated to sector 
1) a 
We differentiate (1.s)relationship between kd and e may be derived. 
dkd with factor proportions constant. 
and (B.2) totally and then solve for de 




dkd = kd ______
(B. 3) de 2 c - 1 




If £ > 1, then it can be shown that dkd._ > o if ~~l km2> kd-.de kdl 2 
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since factor proportions are determined by w and p, we may write2 
(B. 4) 
1¥e > 0 
substituting (B.4) into (B.l) and noting that all factor prices are 
-
determined by w and p, we obtain the expression
2 
(B.5) = 
Denote the rest of the world's labor force by L* and the rest of the 
world's net imports of connnodity 2 per laborer by z2
*. Assume, as in 
the standard literature, that z depends only on relative connnodity2 
prices. Then the balance of payments condition may be written as 
Differentiating this expression totally yields 
(Lz - L* pz *)
(B. 7) 3 1 2 dP + L az/ ae deap dum = 0dum 
It can be shown that 
(B. 8) = 
where n * is the absolute value of rest of the world price elasticity of 
2 
demand for imports and n is the absolute value of home country's price
1 
elasticity of demand for imports with the employment rate and w2 held 






Denote the marginal propensity to consume commodity 1 out of wage income 
by Mlw and the marginal propensity to consume commodity 1 out of non-wage 
income by Mly" These are the partial derivatives of (1.16) with respect 
tow and y. Denote the incrsase in the sector 1 share of aggregate output 
due to a rise in the employment rate (with factor prices constant) by 
Ble. Thus the partial derivative of net imports per laborer with respect 
to the employment rate may be written as 
(B.10) = 
Since the total capital employment ratio is assumed to be higher in 
sector 1 than it is in sector 2, Ble must be negative. 
Therefore, if 
(B.11) 
and commodity 1 is not inferior in the sense that neither Mlw nor Mly 
is negative, then 
(B .12) 
. Under these conditions, it is clear that 
(B.13) 
dP
ford- has been shown to be negative. 
um
1 
See condition (2.10). 
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The requirement that the user cost of domestically-produced not be 
less than that of imported equipment is a sufficient but not necessary 
condition for (B.13) to hold. As long as the total capital employment 
ratio is higher in sector l than it is in sector 2, and commodity one 
is not in inferior condition 
(B.14) 
will hold. Since the sign of dP/d- does not depend on condition (B.11),
um 
dc/d u.m will be positive if the Marshall-Lerner condition is met and ud1 
is less than u provided that 
m 
(B.15) 
The assumption that the relatively labor intensive good is exported is not 
crucial. Provid~d that the share of labor in sector 2 is less than twice that 
of the labor share in sector 1, the increase in the output share of 
sector 2 due to an increase in the employment rate (S 2e) will be greater 
than uni t::,r. See Kemp f 3 ] • If the condition a >.1/ cle = w1 (M2w- B2e) + 
u ) 
'¥ 




when commodity 2, the labor intensive good, is imported. 
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